El artículo muestra, en primer lugar, cómo lo que hasta ahora se ha venido conociendo como Prólo-go a la Obra de las Proposiciones del Maestro Eckhart en realidad ha de ser considerado como su tratado Sobre el Ser el Ente y la Nada, al que él mismo se refiere en sus Sermones y Lecciones sobre el Eclesiás-tico. En segundo lugar, el artículo analiza la relación entre los dos Comentarios al Génesis del Maestro Eckhart existentes: Su Exposición del Génesis y su Libro de las Parábolas del Génesis.
I. INTRODUCTION: MEISTER ECKHART'S WORKS
As it is well-known, Meister Eckhart (d. 1328 ) wrote his works both in Latin and in German, and to be more precise: in Middle High German (Mittelhochdeutsch). With regard to the German works, 1 we know of three treatises, although the authenticity of one of them (namely the treatise On Detachment) is still questioned among scholars. 2 The authenticity of the other two extant treatises, that is, The Talks (or Discourses) on Instruction and The Book
The last mentioned manuscript (B) only contains Eckhart's Commentary on John's Gospel and so it will not play any role in my following discussion. There are in addition also a Basle manuscript containing numerous excerpts of Eckhart's Opus tripartitum (Sigle K), 13 but it is not relevant for the question I am concerned with in this paper. In the same way, I will not take into consideration the other twelve extant manuscripts containing some minor Latin works by Eckhart, 14 since none of them has anything to do with the Three-Part Work. I will just concentrate my efforts on the elucidation of the from number (1) to (4) aforementioned manuscripts, in order to state a framework which will enable us to better understand the following discussion on b o t h Eckhart's Treatise On Being, What Is, and Nothing (De esse, ente et 
nihilo) a n d the relationship between his two extant Commentaries on Genesis, that is, between the Expositio libri Genesis (which I will refer to in English as the Expositio on Genesis) and the Liber parabolarum Genesis (which English speaking scholars know as the Book of the Parables of Genesis).
Now, what is Eckhart's Three-Part Work? And which of his writings are to be considered as constitutive parts of this Work? First I shall try to answer these questions by analysing the extant General Prologue to the Three-Part Work (Prologus generalis in Opus tripartitum), which the four manuscripts I am taking here into consideration include and which was doubtless written by Eckhart himself.
II. MEISTER ECKHART'S OPUS TRIPARTITUM

A. The General Prologue to the Three-Part Work
In this General Prologue, Eckhart explains what he is about to do in his Opus tripartium. He first enumerates the three different parts which, as he writes, will constitute the work: «We should distinguish within the whole work three different main parts. The first part is a Work Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval, 23 (2016) , ISSN: 1133-0902, pp. 259-289 of General Propositions, the second is a Work of Questions, [and] 16 The extant manuscripts however do not contain any work belonging to the second of the announced parts, that is, neither any disputed question nor the Prologue to the Work of Questions. We surely know of some disputed questions by Eckhart, to be more exact, of nine of them, contained in two different manuscripts ( 18 but they all are not presented here as a part of the Opus tripartitum but just as forming part of collections of questions disputed by different magistri of the University of Paris at the beginning of the 14 th century. My following analysis will not focus, however, on Eckhart's Work of Questions, but on the two other parts of the Three-Part Work, that is, on his Work of Propositions -to which the treatise On Being, What is, and Nothing was conceived (by Eckhart himself) to belong-and on the Work of Commentaries, which contains, so it seems, the two extant commentaries on Genesis by Eckhart (Expositio on Genesis and the Book of the Parables of Genesis).
B. The Work of Propositions
Introduction
In the General Prologue to the Three-Part Work, Eckhart also enumerates the titles of fourteen treatises he is about to write for the intended first part of the work, that is, for the Work of Propositions. 19 The first one will be, he says, a treatise On Being and What Is as de philosophie, 19 (1927), pp. 69-85 . See also the historico-critical edition by B. Geyer, in LW, Vol. V, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1936 -2006 (Questions 1 to 3).
18 These six questions were first edited by M. Grabmann in the above, note 17, mentioned study. However, Grabmann considered only two of these questions as genuine works of Eckhart. This was also the opinion of B. Geyer, who therefore included just these two questions, edited as Questions 4 and 5, in his historico-critical edition (LW, Vol. V, . Recently, Markus Vinzent managed to show that also the four questions Grabmann had considered as spurious should be seen as a genuine work of Eckhart; cf. Vinzent, M., «Questions on the Attributes Medieval, 23 (2016) , ISSN: 1133-0902, pp. 259-289 
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well as on the opposite of this, that is, on Nothing (De esse et ente et eius opposito quod est nihil).
20 However, none of these treatises mentioned by Eckhart, so it seems, are extant. Most scholars even think that Eckhart had not written any of them, although Eckhart himself occasionally refers to some of these treatises in his extant works, for example in his Sermons and Lectures on the Twenty-fourth Chapter of «Ecclesiasticus» to both the treatise On the Nature of Superior and Inferior Things (De natura superioris et inferioris) 21 and the first of the aforementioned treatises, that is, the treatise On Being, What Is, and Nothing (De esse, ente et nihilo) . 
The Prologue to the Work of Propositions
The only extant part of Eckhart's Work of Propositions, so it seems, is the Prologue to it: the Prologue to the Work of Propositions (Prologus in Opus propositionum) . This is a quite extensive Prologue, which is comprised of 225 lines in the critical edition by Konrad Weiß. I will try to substantiate this claim below, but let me first raise another question: why do scholars -all of them-speak here not of a «treatise» but of a «prologue»? The answer is 20 Ibid., n. 4, LW, Vol. I/1, p. 150,1 (Recensio CT); LW, Vol. I/2, p. 23,3 (Recensio L). 21 Id., Sermones et lectiones super Ecclesiastici c. 24,23-31, n. 13, in LW, Vol. II, ed. J. Koch and H. Fischer, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1954-1992, p. 243,4f I think it is quite clear that these two preliminary remarks constitute the -short-Prologue to both the Work of Propositions as a whole and the first treatise of this work, that is, to the treatise On Being, What Is, and Nothing. For Eckhart explicitly says, as we have quoted above, that these two preliminary remarks «should enable us to well understand what it will be said below both in this treatise» (that is, in the treatise, as he had just said, «on Being and What Is, and on the opposite of this, which is Nothing») «itself and in some others following it».
But the question I raised above still remains unanswered: why do scholars -all of them, without any exception-call not only these two preliminary remarks but also the following text as a whole the Prologue to the Work of Propositions? Surely -again-because Eckhart himself introduces «as a Prologue» (prooemialiter) not only the passages we have just discussed ( § § 2 and 3), but also the following ones, the whole work. Let me quote § 4 as the immediate continuation of the passages I have just discussed:
We have therefore to notice as the Prologue (Notandum ergo prooemialiter) first that God alone is, is a unity, is true and is good [in the proper sense]; second that because of God all things are, are a unity, are true and are good; third that immediately because of God all things are, are a unity, are true and are good; fourth that if I say: «this being thing», or «this unity» (or «this unity there»), or «this true thing» (or «this true thing there»), «this good thing» (or «this good thing there»), then the expressions «this» and «this [...] Eckhart's discussion of these four theses, which are explicitly introduced here -again-«as the Prologue» (prooemialiter), actually constitutes the whole text that follows, which is known as Eckhart's Prologue to the Work of Propositions. Now, this «prooemialiter» -to be more exact: this second «prooemialiter», because Eckhart had already used this expression, as we have seen above, a few lines before, when introducing the first two «preliminary remarks»-seems suspicious to me. How can it be, that only a few lines after he has discussed two «preliminary remarks» «as the Prologue» (quaedam prooemialiter sunt praenotanda), he announces four further remarks to be discussed -again-«as the Prologue» (Notandum ergo prooemialiter)?
In order to answer this question let us take a look at the paragraphs in which each of these four further remarks are introduced by Eckhart in his subsequent discussion: [...] . And this is the third of the four main remarks which were announced above (Et hoc est tertium principale inter quattuor superius praemissa), namely that all being things -each of them-not only have received but also have immediately received (that is, without any mediation at all) their entire being, their entire unity, their truth as well as their entire goodness. 32 [...] .
A thing does not get a more perfect being, nor a more perfect unity, nor it becomes more true, nor better, because of its being «this» or «that» thing, «this» or «that» unity, «this» or «that» true thing, «this» good thing or «this» good thing «there». And this is the fourth of the four main remarks which were announced above (Et hoc est quartum principale supra praemissum With regard to the third and the fourth remarks, Eckhart uses, as we see, the expressions tertium principale respectively quartum principale, meaning «the third» (and «the fourth») «of the four main remarks announced above». These remarks -of course not only the third and the fourth but also the first and the second-are therefore to be seen not as merely «preliminary remarks» functioning «as the Prologue» but as the main points or aspects constituting the main structure of the text, that is, these differentiations in four points or aspects actually constitute the main division of the whole text. Medieval authors -among them, of course, also Eckhart himself-use the adverb principaliter in order to introduce such a main division of the text. 34 And I think this is the word which Eckhart had originally written, which was thereafter misunderstood or misread by some copyist, by reading -and copying-here not principaliter but prooemialiter, obtaining thereby this «second» prooemialiter. Actually, in the manuscript of Erfurt (E) ens, unum, verum, bonum [in margine]. 36 This is, of course, a false reading of some anonymous copyist; it shows clearly, however, that this passage was from the beginning a problematic one, which later copyists tried to resolve by writing prooemialiter. Let us sum up the argument and formulate it briefly as follows: Things of which a predicate «p» is predicated in an analogical sense do not contain rooted in themselves in a positive manner the form p, according to which they are said to be in an analogical sense «p». Now, any created thing is said «to be», «to be true» and «to be good» in an analogical sense, [namely] insofar as it is referred to God [in which alone «being» is rooted in a positive manner]. Therefore, any created thing has -considered as a [merely] created thing-not in itself rooted in a positive manner its being, its life [and] its knowledge, so that it, considered [merely] as something produced and created, is always lacking something else as well as always having need of something else; for it is not by itself but just because of something else.
We also have to notice here that some authors, having not rightly understood what it really means to say that «a thing is in an analogical sense p», have been understanding this doctrine [of the analogy of being] in a false manner until now. But we understand the analogy [of being] according to the true doctrine, as it was explained in the first Book [of the Work] of Propositions. We say then that the verses [i.e. Eccl. 24,29] state in a completely correct manner that «they who eat me, shall yet hunger», expressing thereby this right meaning of the analogy, according to which every thing is said in an analogical sense «to be» [«to be true», «to be good»], [namely insofar as it is referred to God]. Beings are eating of something -insofar as they «are»-; but they are [at the same time] -insofar as they are just because of something else-lacking of something else. 38
I have given here a -partly-free translation of the passage, in order to clarify the structure of Eckhart's argumentation in it. Eckhart's proof presents two premises followed by the conclusion. Let us analyse all these three steps separately. There is first the major-premise: Analogata nihil in se habent positive radicatum formae secundum quam analogantur. My translation of this («Things of which a predicate ‹p› is predicated in an analogical sense do not contain rooted in themselves in a positive manner the form p, according to which they are said to be in an analogical sense ‹p›») depends upon what Eckhart had explained in a paragraph just before, by using an Aristotelian example (health, healthy):
For example: one and the same health which is in a [healthy] animated being -even this one-is in a [healthy] food and in a [healthy] urine. This is the case, however, not insofar as health itself is in the [healthy] food and in the [healthy] urine -for in these both [that is, in a healthy food and in a healthy urine] is health itself just as little as it is in a stone. But this is only the case insofar as these both [that is, a healthy food and a healthy urine] mean [or refer to] even this same health which is itself [only] in a [healthy] animated being. In the same way, a circle [which in the Middle Ages used to be put at the door of a pub where it was possible to get some wine] means [that you can get there] wine, although there is nothing in a circle having anything to do with wine. 39 This is, of course, the crucial premise for Eckhart's argument, based on an Aristotelian example, with Eckhart interpreting it, however, in a non-Aristotelian sense. 40 For Aristotle uses this example to make it clear that there are many different ways that things can be said to be «healthy», although he, as he stresses at the same time, is not questioning thereby that there is just one health as the fundamental reason making all these different ways to be different ways to be «healthy». In contrast, Eckhart insists on the fact that health as such is only in one of the «things» that we call «healthy» (in the healthy animated being), whereas we call other things «healthy» (for instance some kind of food, or some kind of urine) not because health itself is in them, but only insofar as they mean or refer to the only «thing» being «healthy» by itself: because a certain kind of food contributes to the health of an animated being we call it a «healthy food»; and because a certain kind of urine is a sign of a healthy animated being we call it a «healthy urine».
The minor-premise then follows (Sed omne ens creatum analogatur deo in esse, veritate et bonitate) («Any created thing is said ‹to be›, ‹to be true› and ‹to be good› in an analogical sense, [namely] insofar as it is referred to God [in which alone «being» is rooted in a positive manner]»). This premise simply expresses a thesis which was commonly accepted at that time -at least by all Aristotelian thinkers, like Albert the Great, Siger of Brabant, Thomas Aquinas or Godfrey of Fontaines-, according to which «being» is not said of God and the creatures in a univocal, nor equivocal, but in an analogical sense. Now, what does this mean for an Aristotelian thinker, for example for Albert the Great? Albert uses the adverb analogice as a synonym for proportionaliter. 41 about the natural way of being which was -and still is-given to it by God, its creator. There is therefore not just a single way of being -the divine or absolute one-which everything would have to have in order to (in a proper or divine sense) «be», but there are various ways in which things can be said to (in a proper or divine sense) «be». This variation now depends on the particular nature of every thing, given to it by God through the act of creation. «To be a man» does not mean the same as «to be a horse», but by his being-a-man a particular man is bringing about his «being» (in the proper or absolute sense of the word), just as a horse is bringing about its «being» (in an absolute sense of this word) simply by its being-a-horse. «To be» in an absolute or divine manner (esse absolute seu simpliciter) is not different from «to be in a particular [or determined] manner» (esse hoc vel illud). There are therefore various ways how things can be said to «be», but this variety represents at the same time a unity, because there is just one efficient cause -God-for the existence of such a variety.
42
Siger of Brabant and Godfrey of Fontaines, who both understand this doctrine of the analogy of being in a similar way to Albert the Great, speak in this context of an identity of being (esse) and essence (essentia). 43 Here «essence» means the particular way of being of things, which is defined by their proper «form»: the form of man defines, for instance, what man is, its «nature», which is, of course, different from what -let us say-a horse is. The thesis of the identity of «essence» and «being» means therefore that things are just what they -considered as defined or even determined by their natural form-are. The form of the thing, which is rooted «in» the thing itself, differentiating this thing -for instance a man-from other ways of being -for instance from being-a-horse-, defines therefore what things really «are». The form can, of course, imply -and actually (mostly) implies-a reference to matter as a constitutive element of a particular way of being; in the case of man, for instance, to a body making it possible to be-aman, that is, to exist or to be there as a man. To sum up: things «are» even what they are «being by themselves», because their essentia (defined by their form, which is not to be seen as opposed to the material constitution of things) constitutes their esse. Of course, a thing is not by itself with regard to its existence, which was -and, in a sense, still is-given to it by God by creating it from nothing. That is the reason why we do not have to refer this thesis of the identity of essence and being, as Siger of Brabant explicitly points out, to the existence of the thing but only to its essential being: a thing cannot bring itself into existence, but nonetheless it is nothing else than what it itself -in virtue of its own form rooted in itself-is:
We have to say to this that in this [Avicennian] This passage means that the thesis of the identity of being and essence is not to be applied to the existence of things, which, Siger says, was given to them -and, in a certain sense, is still being given to them now and as long as they keep existing-by God as their efficient cause. This is even the position of both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. 45 Of course, the essence of a thing would not «be» or «exist» -unless merely as a thought of God-, if God had not had created this thing. And this is the reason why both for Albert the Great and for Thomas Aquinas essence and being are not identical but «really different»: because even the essence as that what a thing is «by itself» (ex se or per se) is ultimately given -by God-to the thing, which, without this creative action of God as its efficient cause bringing it into existence, would be pure nothing. According to all the aforementioned Aristotelians -that is, according to Albert the Great as well as Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Godfrey of Fontaines-the following thesis is correct: given (because of the creative action of God) the world, a thing is what it really is just «by», «because of» or even «in virtue of» its own form, that is, in virtue of the form which is rooted in this thing itself. And this is too the -Aristotelian-thesis Eckhart is criticising with his particular interpretation of the analogy of being which has been explained above. Let me quote the conclusion of his argumentation again:
Therefore, any created thing has -considered as a [merely] created thing-not in itself rooted in a positive manner its being, its life [and] its knowledge, so that it, considered [merely] as something produced and created, is always lacking something else as well as always having need of something else; for it is not by itself but just because of something else. 46 This thesis is, of course, also true for Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, but not in the same sense as Eckhart is stating it. According to Aristotelian thinkers, things «are» in virtue of their own forms, which are rooted in the things themselves. But even after they have been created by God, things are, according to Eckhart, not in virtue of their own forms, but only insofar as they are referred to God as to the one «thing» being by itself or in an absolute manner. By its «being-itself» a thing is not being what it itself really is, but this «thing» has to We have therefore to notice as the Prologue (Notandum ergo prooemialiter) first that God alone is, is a unity, is true and is good [in the proper sense]; second that because of God things are, are a unity, are true and are good; third that immediately because of God things are, are a unity, are true and are good; fourth that if I say: «this being thing», or «this unity» (or «this unity there»), or «this true thing» (or «this true thing there»), «this good thing» (or «this good thing there»), then the expressions «this» and «this [...] there» do not signify any aspect in virtue of which things were more [or better] than when they just are [in the absolute sense of the expression] nor in virtue of which they were more [or better] a unity than when they just are a unity [in the absolute sense of the expression], nor in virtue of which they were more truthful than when they just are truthful [in the absolute sense of the expression], nor in virtue of which they were better than when they are good [in the absolute sense of the expression]. 49 And there are many other passages in the hitherto called Prologue to the Work of Propositions supporting my claim, for instance the following:
[It is the case] that God alone in the proper or absolute sense is, is a unity, [and] is good, whereas other being things are [just] in a particular [or determined] manner -by their beinga-stone, being-a-lion, being-a-man or something like this-, as well as a particular [or deter-47 Meister Eckhart, Talks of Instruction, DW, Vol. V, ed. by J. Quint, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1954 -1963 (repr. 1987 is nothing but a collection of information he had found in two earlier passages in the manuscript. The first passage is the beginning of the hitherto called Prologue to the Work of Propositions: «In order to be able to well understand what I will say below both in this treatise itself and in some others following it, some previous remarks should be stated before as the Prologue». 54 The second passage is the paragraph n. 11 of the General Prologue to the Three-Part Work:
In order to show -with an example-what kind of method I will use in the entire Three-Part Work, I will carry out here, as a sort of Prologue, the proof of the first proposition, I will also discuss the first question as well as interpret the first verse of the Bible.
The first proposition is: Being is God. 55 What is important to emphasise for the following discussion is the fact that we can observe in Eckhart's Three-Part Work the efforts of -at least-one anonymous editor for presenting Eckhart's Latin works as -at least to some degree-a coherent whole. This is, as it seems, already the case with the earliest extant version of the work, as we find it in the Erfordian manuscript (E). And we will see that this is the case not only with regard to the so-called Prologue to the Work of Propositions, but also with Eckhart's commentaries on Genesis. The Erfordian manuscript (E) contains an earlier, yet uncompleted version of the Expositio on Genesis, which is known among scholars as «Recensio E». This version presents many important marginal additions in this manuscript, which, when taken together with the earlier version («Recensio E1»), constitute a new but still uncompleted «Recensio E2». 59 We find in the Oxonian manuscript (L) a further extended version («Recensio L»).
C. The Work of Commentaries
All the aforementioned manuscripts of the Opus tripartitum (E, L, T and C) also containalong with the discussed Prologues as well as other works by Eckhart-the Expositio on Genesis, indeed even four different versions of it, as we see in the following
60 Finally, the so-called «Recensio CT», which we find in both the manuscript of Kues (C) and of Trier (T), is similar to -but not identical with-the Oxonian version L.
61 Both Konrad Weiß and Loris Sturlese consider this «Recensio CT» as (to a certain extent) resulting from the editorial action of some anonymous editor. 62 And I am sure they are right with this hypothesis.
The second extant Commentary on Genesis by Eckhart, that is, his Book of the Parables of Genesis, is contained only in the manuscripts of Oxford (L), Kues (C) and Trier (T), but not in the Erfordian one (E). In the Oxonian manuscript (L)
, it precedes the Three-Part Work, whereas the anonymous editor of the «Recensio CT» presents it after the Expositio on Genesis, as if also it should be seen as a constituent part of the Three-Part Work, and therefore as Eckhart's «Second Commentary on Genesis». We have also in this case to distinguish a better text, contained in the Oxonian manuscript («Recensio L»), from the -let us say-«less better» one we find in both C and T («Recensio C»):
L (Oxford) C/T (Kues and Trier)
Prologue and who wrote these marginal additions took the new passages directly from the additions Eckhart himself had done in the meantime; cf. Sturlese, «Über die Entstehung und die Entwicklung», pp. XVIf. However, I think there is another possible and maybe more plausible explanation for this: the copyist compared the early version (E1) with a later one he had found in another, now lost manuscript containing E2, and wrote the missing passages in the margins of the manuscript E. As is well-known, such a procedure was not unusual in the Middle Ages. Having said this, we are able to establish some probable conclusions with regard to the relationship between Eckhart's commentaries on Genesis:
• Eckhart's Expositio on Genesis is older than his Book of the Parables of Genesis.
Why 
III. THE RELATIONS HIP BETWEEN THE EXPOSITIO ON GENESIS AND THE BOOK OF THE PARABLES OF GENESIS
However, the fundamental question still remains unanswered: Why did Meister Eckhart write two different commentaries on Genesis? What kind of relationship is there between Eckhart's Expositio on Genesis and his Book of the Parables of Genesis?
A. The «classical» Answer
The «classical» answer to this question is the following: In the Expositio on Genesis, Eckhart interprets the text primarily looking for its merely historical or literal sense, whereas in the Book of the Parables of Genesis he does it allegorically or, as he himself says in Latin, parabolice, that is, looking for the deep meaning of the text, which might be -and often actuadi integrare il Liber nell'Opus in qualità di supplemento alla prima esposizione del Genesi». Cf. id., «Un nuovo manoscritto delle opere latine di Eckhart e il suo significato per la ricostruzione del testo e della storia dell'Opus tripartitum», in R. Imbach and Ch. Flüeler (eds.), Albert der Große und die deutsche Dominikanerschule. Philosophische Perspektiven, Fribourg (Swiss), Universitätsverlag, 1985, pp. 145-154, here p. 146 lly is-quite different from its merely literal sense. 71 Since a «parable» is for Eckhart an «alle-gory», it would be possible to translate the title of the Liber parabolarum Genesis with Book of the Allegories of Genesis. By using this allegorical method, he is not only depending upon Moses Maimonides, to whom he himself refers in the Prologue to this Book, 72 but especially upon Origen of Alexandria, who is, also in other contexts, a crucial source for Eckhart. 73 The allegorical interpretation of the biblical texts enables Eckhart to see them as expressing some important philosophico-theological theses, which at first glance -that is to say: when we read the texts just in their historical or literal sense-are not identifiable at all.
The «classical» answer to the question about the relationship between Eckhart's Commentaries on Genesis is actually, so it seems, the answer he himself has given to in the Prologue to the Book of the Parables of Genesis. Let me quote the very first sentence of this book:
After I have explained in the first commentary what, as it seemed to me, should be said concerning the manifest meaning of Genesis, my intention in this commentary of the parables [i.e. of the allegories] [...] is to work out some latent meanings which are allegorically contained (parabolice contenta) «under the skin of the litteral text». 74 However, this «classical» answer cannot be right. First of all, because Eckhart is already using the allegorical method of interpretation in the Expositio on Genesis, not now and again or occasionally but even as the main method for understanding the texts. Yet, this allegorical method is precisely the one Eckhart uses to apply not only for its interpretation on Genesis but altogether, as he explains himself in the so-called «Second Prologue to the Work of Commentaries». This Prologue is contained in both the manuscript of Erfurt (E) and the one of Kues (C), preceding in both cases Eckhart's Commentary on Wisdom. This Prologue was doubtlessly written by Eckhart himself. However, it is surely not a work defi-nitively prepared for publishing but it is rather to be seen in the context of Eckhart's academic lectures, particularly in relation with an introductory lecture for a course on some biblical book(s), probably -but surely not only-on the Book of Wisdom. It might originally have been either a collection of private notes used by Eckhart for such an introductory lecture or a reportatio made by some participant in the lecture. Recently, Loris Sturlese has written that this «Second Prologue to the Work of Commentaries» should be seen as being older than the aforementioned «First Prologue to the Work of Commentaries».
75 And I think he is right. Eckhart says here very clearly that his interpretation will often be an allegorical one:
With regard to this work here, there are five aspects which should be [preliminary] noted. [...] .
Thirdly, it should be noted that I frequently interpret these biblical verses in a sense which is different from the immediate meaning of the letter; they are relevant [not because of the literal sense but] because of the true and proper sense of the letter. 76 This is a very strong reason, I think, to say that the first sentence of the Prologue to the Book of the Parables of Genesis, which I have already quoted above, 77 was not written -in contrast to what scholars have been hitherto thinking-by the author himself but by some anonymous editor after he had brought these two commentaries on Genesis together, which he, as Sturlese has shown, 78 had previously found as separate works. This anonymous editor has read Eckhart's Prologue to the Book of the Parables of Genesis -in which Eckhart, as we have seen, actually emphasizes that he wants to interpret the texts allegorically-and he thought (so-to-speak in addition to this intention actually expressed by Eckhart himself) the following: «in contrast to what he (i.e. Eckhart) And this is not an isolated case, because there are many other instances in which we can detect such an intrusion of an anonymous editor in Eckhart's original texts. This is especially the case, as both Konrad Weiß and Loris Sturlese have already detected, with regard to the «Recen-sio CT».
80 Let me quote a passage taken from the Expositio on Genesis as an example for this:
E (Erfurt)
And God said: «Let there be light».
L (Oxford)
CT Recensio (Kues and Trier)
And God said: «Let there be light» [...] . «And God said». On the nature of God's «saying» -namely what he says and to whom among the divine and creatural beings he speaks, as well as how he speaks-, moreover: on how everything hears God's speaking and how it responds to him, you will find many nice comments on all these aspects in the second Commentary [on Genesis], namely in the Commentary on the Parables of Genesis. 83 I do not think it is possible to conceive Eckhart writing about his own comments in the Book of the Parables of Genesis that they are «nice comments» (pulchra). This reference was surely not put there by Eckhart himself. But I think this is also the case with all the references to the «first» Commentary on Genesis, that is, to the Expositio on Genesis. We find in the «second» one, for example in § 8, presenting an identical text in both recensions, L and CT: «In the beginning God made heaven and earth». The introductory formulation here («This verse was interpreted in the first Commentary [on Genesis] in many different ways. With regard to the current intention [I have to say that]»), was not written by Eckhart himself but by some anonymous editor after having brought together both commentaries on Genesis he had previously found as separate works. I am claiming therefore that there was an intervention or intrusion of a single anonymous editormaybe even of some various editors-in Eckhart's original texts not only with regard to the «Recensio CT», as both K. Weiß and L. Sturlese had already detected, but also in the «Recen-sio L» as we find it in the Oxonian manuscript (L), yet, as we have seen above, also in the «Recensio E» as it is contained in the Erfordian manuscript (E), that is, also in the earliest version we know of Eckhart's Three-Part Work.
B. A. Distinction between a Published Work and its Previous Version as a Lecture Manuscript?
As I have explained, the «classical» answer to the question why did Eckhart write two different Commentaries on Genesis is not right. We have to acknowledge that in any natural action or production, the principle which brings about something outside of the producer, by proceeding from something which is not [e.g. which is not white] to something which is [e.g. which is white], is to be defined as a «cause». [ «creature», both because it has been produced outside of its producer and because it has been produced by proceeding from something which is not to something which is, for 96 This must have been the case, because some passages of Eckhart's Expositio on Genesis were examined in the course of his inquisition trial in Cologne, with Eckhart himself trying to justify them in his Response, which means that he acknowledged this work as his own. See, for example, Meister Eckhart, Responsio ad articulos sibi impositos de scriptis et dicits suis, n. 120 (Processus Coloniensis I), LW, Vol. V, ed. by L. Sturlese, p. 290,6-11 (Eckhart's Response to Processus Coloniensis I, n. 43, ibid., pp. 312, 3 (= Expositio libri Genesis, n. 7, LW, Vol. I/2, p. 65, (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) My translation here is, of course, a certain interpretation of the passage: What things (in the proper sense) «are», that is, what things «really» are, is not merely defined or just determined by their natural way of being (esse hoc), but they only are «really» by realising their absolute or divine being, which is, Eckhart says, not just a certain, particular or determined way of being, but rather being in an absolute manner (esse simpliciter seu absolute). The philosophical position Eckhart is criticising in this passage defines reality as something merely «being there», as a whole consisting of «facts» (facta) or «products» (facta) being there as determined by some external causes (effecta). According to such a metaphysical position, we would have to consider reality as a whole of effects: as things presenting a certain way of being determined by their natural form: things which are merely there, re-acting in a characteristic manner defined by their form to different causes influencing -or just determiningthem. In primarily critisicing -by an interpretation of Genesis-such a radical naturalistic, almost positivistic position. «Radical Naturalism» means here just a position according to which we have to refer our judgements on morals and metaphysics to things as they naturally are, to things as we can know them starting from our sense-experience. We have, so it seems, to accord our life to the facts (facta).
99 Meister Eckhart's Book of the Parables of Genesis is surely to be seen in this context: as a published treatise (by Eckhart himself in this form) arguing for a non-naturalistic position, trying to show that you cannot use Genesis -particularly not Gn 1:31 («God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good»)-to defend Naturalism as t h e Christian position. 100 You can -maybe you even «have to»-interpret Genesis in a nonnaturalistic way. Let me show such an intention by analysing a further passage in the Book of the Parables of Genesis, namely Eckhart's interpretation of the third chapter of Genesis, beginning with the verse: «Now, the serpent was more crafty than any other beast of the field that the Lord God had made» (Gn 3,1). 101 
